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COMMENTS 
BABCOCK V. JACKSON: THE TRANSITION FROM THE LEX 
LOCI DELICTI RULE TO THE DOMINANT 
CONTACTS APPROACH 
In the recent case of Babcock v. Jackson1 the New York Court of 
Appeals refused to apply Ontario's guest statute,2 which would have 
barred recovery, even though Ontario was the place where the automobile 
accident giving rise to the suit occurred. Babcock is the culmination of a 
judicial trend toward the abandonment of the traditional lex loci delicti 
principle of choice of tort law, under which the law of the place of injury 
determines a plaintiff's right of action in tort. Having finally repudiated the 
traditional lex loci delicti principle,3 the court in Babcock adopted a new 
approach to choice of tort law, under which the law of the state having 
"dominant contacts" with the transaction governs the suit. This comment 
will examine the lex loci delicti rule and the judicial transition from it to 
the new "dominant contacts" approach enunciated in Babcock, with some 
attempt to consider unresolved difficulties in the newer approach to choice 
of tort law. 
THE Lex Loci Delicti RULE 
The traditional rule for choice of tort law has been that the lex loci 
delicti, the law of the place of the wrong, determines all questions of sub-
stantive law in tort suits,4 unless that law is contrary to a strong public 
l 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279 (1963), 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, reversing 17 App. Div. 2d 694, 
230 N.Y.S.2d 114 (1962) (which contained an excellent dissenting opinion by Judge 
Halpern); 12 BUFFALO L. REv. 359 (1963). See also Currie, Conflict, Crisis and Confusion 
in New York, 1963 DUKE L.J. 1, 34-39. 
2 ONTARIO REv. STAT. (1960) ch. 172, § 105(2): "[T]he owner or driver of a motor 
vehicle, other than a vehicle operated in the business of carrying passengers for com• 
pensation, is not liable for any loss or damage resulting from bodily injury to, or the death 
of any person being carried in ••. the motor vehicle." 
s The lex loci delicti rule had come under increasing attack from the writers. See, e.g., 
in chronological order, Lorenzen, Territoriality, Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws, 
33 YALE L.J. 736 (1924); Yntema, The Hombook Method and the Conflict of Laws, 37 
YALE L.J. 468 (1928); Lorenzen, Tort Liability and the Conflict of Laws, 47 L.Q. REv. 483 
(1931); Cook, Tort Liability and the Conflict of Laws, 35 COLUM. L. REv. 202 (1935); 
Rheinstein, The Place of Wrong: A Study in the Method of Case Law, 19 TUL. L. REv. 
4, 165 (1944); Cheatham, American Theories of Conflict of Laws: Their Role and Utility, 
58 HARV. L. REv. 361 (1945); Morris, The Proper Law of a Tort, 64 HARV. L. REv. 881 
(1951); Currie, Survival of Actions: Adjudication Versus Automation in the Conflict of 
Laws, IO STAN. L. REv. 205 (1958); Stumberg, "The Place of the Wrong": Torts and the 
Conflict of Laws, 34 WASH. L. REv. 388 (1959); Ehrenzweig, .The Lex Fori-Basic Rule in 
the Conflict of Laws, 58 MICH. L. REv. 637 (1960); Currie, Conflict, Crisis and Confusion 
in New York, 1963 DuKE L.J. I. 
4 REsrATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws § 384 (1934): "(I) If a cause of action in tort is 
created at the place of wrong, a cause of action will be recognized in other states. (2) If 
no cause of action is created at the place of wrong, no recovery in tort can be had in 
any other state." See generally LEFLAR, CONFLICT OF LAws § 110 (1959); Goodrich, Tort 
Obligations and the Conflict of Laws, 73 U. PA. L. REv. 19 (1924). 
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policy of the forum.IS The rule has been associated historically with the 
vested rights theory,6 under which rights and obligations defined by the 
law of a particular jurisdiction vest in the parties and follow them into 
any other jurisdiction where suit may be brought.7 The vested rights theory 
presupposes that there is a single jurisdiction in which rights vest, even 
though the important aspects of the transaction may have occurred in more 
than one jurisdiction.8 The theory consequently requires a jurisdiction-
selecting rule to determine which law defines the rights which have vested,9 
and the lex loci delicti principle has served as this jurisdiction-selecting 
rule in suits for torts. It selects the law of the place of injury to govern all 
issues that arise.10 
The claimed advantages of the lex loci delicti rule are that it leads to 
uniform treatment of a cause of action in all jurisdictions where it might 
be litigated, and therefore discourages forum shopping, and also that the 
rule is easy to apply and lends predictability and certainty to the conflict of 
laws.11 These advantages are not to be discounted, but neither should they 
be given undue weight. The lex loci delicti rule leads to uniform treatment 
of a cause of action only to the extent that none of the possible forums has 
a strong public policy which would require a different result.12 Moreover, 
forum shopping is probably not such a major evil that a choice of law 
rule should find much justification in its prevention. The lex loci delicti 
rule is undoubtedly easy to apply in the great majority of cases, but there 
are also many situations where the rule does not dictate a clear result. In 
defamation cases, for example, where injury to the plaintiff's reputation 
may occur in several states as the result of publication in a single news-
IS R.EsTATEMENT, op. cit. supra note 4, § 612, "No action can be maintained upon a 
cause of action created in another state the enforcement of which is contrary to the strong 
public policy of the forum.'' See Mertz v. Mertz, 271 N.Y. 466, 472, 3 N.E.2d 597, 599 
(1936) (public policy defined as "the law of the state, whether found in the Constitution, 
the statutes or judicial records''); see generally Paulsen &: Sovern, "Public Policy" in 
the Conflict of Laws, 56 CoLUM. L. REv. 969 (1956). 
6 See 2 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAws §§ 377-92 (1935); R.EsTATEMENT, op. cit. supra note 4, 
§§ 377-92; SroMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAws 8 (3d ed. 1963). 
7 Slater v. Mexican Nat'! R.R., 194 U.S. 120 (1904) (opinion by Mr. Justice Holmes). 
"The theory of the foreign suit is that although the act complained of was subject to no 
law having force in the forum, it gave rise to an obligation, an obligatio, which like other 
obligations, follows the person, and may be enforced wherever the person be found." 
Id. at 126; Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198 (1918) (opinion by 
Cardozo, J.). "The fundamental public policy is perceived to be that rights lawfully 
vested shall be everywhere maintained.'' Id. at 113, 120 N.E. at 202. 
s In 2 BEALE, op. cit. supra note 6, § 378.1, the reporter for the first Restatement, 
Conflict of Laws states that: "If, therefore, there was no cause of action created at the 
place where the person or thing took harm, or if no cause of action there is proved to 
the court, there can be no recovery for tort." 
9 See Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HAR.v. L. REv. 173, 198 
(1933). 
10 R.EsTATEMENT, op. cit. supra note 4, § 377: "The place of the wrong is in the state 
where the last event necessary to make an actor liable for an alleged tort takes place.'' 
11 Cheatham &: Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law, 52 CoLUM. L. REv. 959, 969, 977 
(1952); Comment, 61 COLUM. L. REv. 1497, 1508 (1961). 
12 See note 5 supra. 
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paper, the law of each of the several states would seem to have equal claim 
to being the appljcable law.13 Furthermore, the lex loci delicti rule has 
not lent predictability and certainty to conflict of laws to the extent 
anticipated. There have been a number of notable instances in which 
courts have either attempted to avoid the effect of the rule by straining its 
exceptions, or have refused to apply the rule at all.14 The rule causes 
unpredictability to the extent that it provokes such aberrant behavior on 
the part of courts seeking to avoid its results. 
Perhaps the major vice of the lex loci delicti rule is that it takes no 
account of policy considerations, and therefore prefers an obvious to a just 
result. The courts that follow this rigid choice of law rule are prevented 
from deciding cases with a view to the social desirability of the outcome.11S 
For example, the state of injury may have no connection with the occurrence 
other than being the situs of the injury, nor any interest in the outcome 
of suit. The forum, on the other hand, may have a legitimate desire to 
apply its own law, because of contacts with the occurrence which give the 
forum an interest in giving effect to its particular policies. Thus, if a man 
in state X writes a letter to an old friend in state Y which contains certain 
defamatory remarks about the former's wife, publication and therefore 
injury to the wife's reputation occur in state Y. Suppose the law of state X 
does not permit a wife to sue her husband in tort, but state Y has no such 
prohibition. Under the lex loci delicti rule, the wife could sue her husband 
in accord with the law of Y,16 even though no relevant policy consideration 
would favor this result. State Y's policy, if any, relates only to spouses 
residing within state Y,17 and yet state X's policy, which is directly con-
cerned with the parties in the case,18 is considered to have no importance. 
Strangely enough, if the old friend omits to open the letter until he sets 
foot in state X, the law of X governs instead because state X rather than 
Y is the lex loci delicti. In this situation, however, the choice of the law of 
state X as the governing law is made regardless of whether state X has an 
13 See Dale System v. Time, 116 F. Supp. 527, 530 (D. Conn. 1953). 
14 See the cases discussed in text accompanying notes 19-57 infra. 
15 Yntema, supra note 3, at 482-83. "The vice of the vested rights theory is that it 
affects to decide concrete cases upon generalities which do not state the practical considera-
tions involved and so it must perforce obscure the issue." Id. at 482-83. 
16 REsTATEMENT, op. cit. supra note 4, § 377, Rule 5, at 457 concludes that in speaking 
of harm to reputation, the place of the wrong is where the defamatory statement is 
communicated. 
17 It should also be noted that certain additional problems exist, the first being whether 
the absence of a law in state Y providing for interspousal immunity implies the existence 
of any affirmative policy on the question. Second, there is a problem whether the policy, 
if any, favoring recovery is intended to benefit all plaintiffs suing in state Y or only 
plaintiffs residing in state Y. See note 81 infra. In the interspousal immunity context, 
however, there is no reason to suppose that state Y would have any particular concern 
one way or another whether nonresident plaintiffs could sue their spouses. 
18 Whether the policy of state X to grant interspousal immunity is designed to prevent 
disruptions in the marital relationship, or to prevent collusion against insurers, that 
policy is relevant to the case because the parties, and probably their insurers, have their 
domicils in state X. See note 80 infra. 
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actual interest in giving effect to its policy of interspousal immunity. It is 
clear that the results of such a mechanical rule can be capricious indeed. 
DOCTRINE IN TRANSITION 
Faced with the occasionally inequitable results of the lex loci delicti 
rule, courts in recent years have not always applied the rule in a purely 
mechanical way. On the contrary, certain recent opinions have demonstrated 
an increasing dissatisfaction with the rule, which amounts to a gradual 
recognition of a need for change in the law. These cases, which may have 
seemed mere aberrations at the time of their decision, now appear to stand 
together as a trend toward the outright rejection of the rule, which finally 
occurred in Babcock v. Jackson. 
In Gordon v. Parker19 Massachusetts applied its own law to permit an 
action for alienation of affections against a Massachusetts doinicilary even 
though Pennsylvania, the state of matrimonial domicil and therefore 
presumably also the state of injury, had abolished civil actions for aliena-
tion of affections. Judge Wyzanski referred in passing to the first Restate-
ment's rule that the forum "generally applies the law of the state where an 
alleged wrong has occurred in deciding whether a person has sustained a 
legal injury."20 He proceeded almost immediately, however, to analyze the 
relative interests of Massachusetts and Pennsylvania in the suit, and 
concluded that Massachusetts' interest in limiting misconduct within her 
own borders was superior to any interest Pennsylvania might have had in 
refusing to give a remedy. Implicit in the decision was a rejection of the 
notions that a tort occurs where injury finally results, and that the law of 
the place of injury must necessarily govern the suit. However, the holding 
was carefully restricted to the facts of the case; there was no direct criticism 
of the lex loci delicti rule, but only an intimation that it was not relevant 
in the particular situation.21 
In Dale System v. Time,22 a federal district court in Connecticut con-
cluded that the law of the place of plaintiff's domicil should apply to a 
libel action where publication had occurred in numerous states.23 This 
holding relieved the court of having to locate a particular state of injury 
whose law would govern the suit, a problem under the lex loci delicti rule 
which, in this sort of situation, would have inevitably proved embarrassing. 
The court insisted that its holding was consistent with the lex loci delicti 
concept, although the effect of the holding was clearly to allow the forum 
to apply its own law where, as the domicil of the plaintiff, it had a sig-
10 83 F. Supp. 40 (D. Mass. 1949), 62 HAR.v. L. R.Ev. 1065 (1949). 
20 83 F. Supp. at 41. 
21 Id. at 42. A further advantage of the court's approach in Gordon was that it avoided 
the problem raised by the le" lod delicti rule of having to decide where the injury 
occurred. 
22 116 F. Supp. 527 (D. Conn. 1953), 102 U. PA. L. REv. 801 (1954). 
2a 116 F. Supp. at 530. 
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nificant contact with the case and · therefore an interest in promoting 
recovery. In a situation where the lex loci delicti rule could not dictate a 
clear result because of the plurality of states of injury, the court adopted 
a rule based on contacts rather than caprice. 
In Grant v. McAuliffe24 the Supreme Court of California concluded 
that California law should govern the question of survival of a tort action 
where Arizona, the place of the injury, did not permit tort actions to be 
brought after the defendant's death. All parties in the case were residents 
of California, and the estate of the deceased tort-feasor was also being 
administered in California. Justice Traynor acknowledged that lex loci 
delicti should govern unless the question of survival was procedural. He 
nonetheless refused to apply the lex loci delicti rule on the grounds that 
(1) survival of causes of action is a procedural question to be governed by 
the law of the forum25 and (2) the survival of causes of action is a question 
of the administration of decedent's estates, and thus to be governed by the 
law of the defendant's domicil.26 Both rationales pointed to application 
of California law in the Grant case. Justice Traynor was apparently so 
impressed by the contacts of California with the case that he sought jus-
tifications for applying California law. He probably would not have wished 
Arizona law to govern the question if Arizona had been the forum, even 
though this would have been the effect of his holding that survival of a 
cause of action is a procedural matter to be governed by the law of the 
forum. Moreover, in order to characterize the question as procedural, Justice 
Traynor was required to rely upon cases decided before the 1934 endorse-
ment of the lex loci delicti rule by the first Restatement, instead of looking 
to the more recent cases which had characterized the issue as substantive.27 
His characterization of the question as procedural appears to have been a 
concession to the lex loci delicti rule, the effect of which the court was try-
ing to avoid in a case where the forum had the most significant contacts 
with the matter at issue.28 The fact that the court also felt the need to 
characterize the question as one of administration of decedent's estates, 
rather than one of tort liability, indicates that the court may have been 
dissatisfied with its characterization of the issue as procedural. It is prob-
able that the motive for both characterizations was to reach a preferred 
result in the particular case without directly challenging the general rule 
of lex loci delicti.29 
24 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P .2d 944 (1953); see Currie, Survival of Actions: Adjudication 
Versus Automation in the Conflict of Laws, IO STAN. L. REv. 205 (1958). 
25 41 Cal. 2d at 866,264 P.2d at 949. 
26 Ibid. 
21 Id. at 863, 264 P .2d at 947. 
28 See Cavers, A Critique.of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HAAv. L. REv. 173, 185-86 
(1933), where the author included the procedural exception in his list of avenues of escape 
for courts wishing to do justice rather than to follow mechanical choice-of-law rules. 
29 This conclusion finds support in a later law review article in which Judge 
Traynor commented on his own opinion in the Grant v. McAulifje case. Traynor, Is This 
Conflict Really Necessary'!, 37 TEXAS L. REv. 657, 670 n.35 (1959): "It may not be amiss 
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Further dissatisfaction with the lex loci delicti rule and a preference for 
a choice of law rule based on contacts was expressed in dictum in Walt on 
v. Arabian American Oil Co.so Judge Frank remarked that lex loci delicti 
should not apply where a tort is committed in an uncivilized country or 
in one having no law that civilized countries would recognize as adequate. 
In such cases, the courts should apply the substantive law of the country 
which is most closely connected with the parties and their conduct.s1 In-
vocation of the public policy exception to the lex loci delicti rule would 
also have prevented application of a barbarous law without departing 
from the framework of the lex loci delicti rule. In this kind of situation, 
however, Judge Frank apparently preferred a choice of law methodology 
based on contacts. 
In Schmidt v. Driscoll Hotel32 a Minnesota court demonstrated a much 
stronger impatience with the lex loci delicti rule, and openly refused to 
apply it at all in a case where Wisconsin, as the place of the tort, had had 
no connection with the occurrence other than being the situs of the injury, 
and no particular interest in the outcome of suit. Both parties were resi-
dents of Minnesota, and the defendant had violated the Minnesota dram-
shop statute by selling liquor to an intoxicated Minnesota resident whose 
driving later injured the plaintiff in Wisconsin. The court recognized that 
Minnesota's interests "in admonishing a liquor dealer whose violation of 
its statutes was a cause of such injuries; and in providing for the injured 
party a remedy therefor" would become ineffective if Wisconsin law were 
applied.33 The court concluded that the lex loci delicti rule "should not 
be held applicable in fact situations such as the present to bring about 
the result described and that a determination to the opposite effect would 
be more in conformity with the principles of equity and justice."34 It is 
noteworthy that there was no attempt in Schmidt to rationalize objection 
to the lex loci delicti rule under the public policy exception. Moreover, 
the court did not limit its objection to the operation of the rule in the 
particular case. The implication was rather that the lex loci delicti rule 
should not be applied in any case where the result would not be in con-
formity with principles of equity and justice; the rule was only to be fol-
lowed if a judicial weighing of interests suggested that application of the 
lex loci delicti would lead to a just result.35 Thus the court openly rejected 
the very idea of a mechanical rule for choice of law. Actual selection of 
to add that although the opinion is my own, I do not regard it as ideally articulated, 
developed as it had to be against the brooding background of a petrified forest. Yet I 
would make no more apology for it than that in reaching a rational result it was less 
deft than it might have been to quit itself of the familiar speech of choice of law." 
so 233 F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1956). 
s1 Id. at 545. 
32 249 Minn. 376, 82 N.W .2d 365 (1957), 71 HARv. L. REv. 1351 (1958). 
ss 249 Minn. at 380, 82 N.W .2d at 368. 
Si Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
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law was to be made by a weighing of interests, and the only function of the 
lex loci delicti rule was to rationalize the result in cases where the place 
of injury also had the strongest interest in the suit. Retained in such an 
emasculated form, the rule might better have been rejected altogether. 
In Haumschild v. Continental Gas. Co.36 the court expressed a different 
sort of dissatisfaction with the operation of the lex loci delicti rule in a 
situation involving interspousal immunity from tort liability. Without 
hearing argument by counsel on the point, the court chose on its own 
motion to overrule previous cases which had held that the law of the place 
of the wrong determines whether spouses could sue each other in tort.81 
The Wisconsin court held that, where the spouses resided in Wisconsin, a 
wife was permitted under Wisconsin law to sue her husband for injuries 
resulting from an accident in California. The rationale of the holding was 
that the question of interspousal immunity was one of family law to be 
governed by the law of the domicil of the parties, and not a question of 
tort law to be governed by the lex loci delicti.38 The court clearly rejected 
the lex loci delicti rule in the particular type of case, with the further com-
ment that "it must be recognized that, in the field of conflict of laws, 
absolutes should not be made the goal at the sacrifice of progress in further-
ance of sound public policy."39 The concurrence suggested an alternative 
method by which the same result could have been reached in the particular 
case without expressly overruling cases adhering to the lex loci delicti rule.40 
However, the court in Haumschild, like the court in Grant v. McAulifje, 
preferred to reclassify the problem rather than permit the lex loci delicti 
rule to continue to control the kind of case in issue. In Haumschild, as in 
Schmidt, the court was no longer content to avoid the effect of the lex 
loci delicti rule in a particular case, but was also willing to challenge the 
applicability of the rule itself to a whole category of cases. Moreover, the 
distinct implication of both opinions was that the lex loci delicti rule was 
generally unsatisfactory because it failed to take account of relevant policy 
considerations. 
In the famous case of Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines41 the New York 
Court of Appeals made a special effort to undermine the lex loci delicti 
rule, although without condemning it directly. The administrator of a 
36 7 Wis. 2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814 (1959), 73 HAR.v. L. REv. 785 (1960). See Ford, Inter-
spousal Immunity for Automobile Accidents in the Conflict of Laws: Law and Reason 
Yersus the Restatement, 15 U. Prrr. L. REv. 397 (1954). 
37 E.g., Buckeye v. Buckeye, 203 Wis. 248, 234 N.W. 342 (1931). 
38 Haumscbild v. Continental Cas. Co., 7 Wis. 2d 130, 137, 95 N.W.2d 814, 818 (1959). 
39 Id. at 138, 95 N.W .2d at 818. 
40 Id. at 143, 95 N.W.2d at 821. The dissent would have applied California law, which 
classifies immunity as a matter of status to be determined by the law of the domicil of 
the parties. 
41 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961). This case has been noted in 
many law reviews, including 61 CoLUM. L. REv. 1497 (1961); 46 CORNELL L.Q. 637 (1961); 
49 GEO. L.J. 768 (1961); 74 HARV. L. REv. 1652 (1961); 15 RUTGERS L. REv. 620 (1961); 28 
U. Cm. L. REv. 733 (1961); 47 VA. L. REv. 692 (1961). See also Currie, supra note I, at 1-22. 
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New York decedent brought an action in New York against a common 
carrier under the Massachusetts wrongful death statute, which limited 
recovery to 15,000 dollars. Massachusetts was the place of the plane crash 
which killed Mr. Kilberg, and also the state of the defendant's incorpora-
tion. It was held that the plaintiff could recover damages under the Massa-
chusetts wrongful death statute without regard to the 15,000-dollar limit 
on recovery. Like the court in the Haumschild case, the court in Kilberg 
was in no way required to take a position challenging the traditional 
operation of the lex loci delicti rule, for the question of the applicability 
of the Massachusetts damage limitation had not even been argued on ap-
peal.42 Nevertheless, the court considered the question sua sponte and 
rationalized its decision that the damage limitation did not apply by resort-
ing to the procedural and public policy exceptions to the rule.43 It is notable 
that the court was willing to fly in the face of authority that the measure 
of damages was a question of substantive law,44 without even being asked 
to do so. Moreover, the court practically confessed that its classification of 
the question as procedural was merely a device to protect the interests of 
New York citizens, "without doing violence to the accepted pattern of 
conflict of laws rules."45 In this regard the position of the court in Kilberg 
is most closely comparable to the opinion in Grant v. McAuliffe. In both 
cases, the courts invoked the procedural exception to avoid the normal 
effect of the lex loci delicti rule in situations where that law would fail 
to give adequate compensation to citizens of the forum. 
The procedural exception was inappropriately invoked in Kilberg. The 
implicit assumption underlying the procedural exception would seem to 
be that merely procedural rules will not affect the substantive rights which 
vest in the plaintiff, and that, for the sake of convenience, the court may 
therefore apply forum law to questions of procedure rather than bothering 
to familiarize itself with the law of another jurisdiction.46 However, in 
Kilberg the holding that a damage limitation was procedural clearly ex-
panded the plaintiff's right to recovery, and the court would hardly have 
42 9 N.Y.2d at 37, 172 N.E.2d at 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 134 (1961). 
43 Id. at 41-42, 172 N.E.2d at 529, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 137. It should be noted that if the 
lex loci delicti rule is stated by saying that the law of the place of injury governs only 
all questions of substantive law in tort suits, then the so-called procedural exception is 
not really an exception but merely a corollary. 
44 Western Union Tel. Co. v. Brown, 234 U.S. 542 (1914); Northern Pac. R.R. v. 
Babcock, 154 U.S. 190 (1894); LEFLAR, op. cit. supra note 4, § 65. 
45 9 N.Y.2d at 39, 172 N.E.2d at 528, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 135. 
46 The customary explanation of the procedural exception speaks principally in terms 
of inconvenience to the forum. For example, in REsrATEMENT, op. cit. supra note 4, at 701 
it is said that: 
"Such [procedural] limitation excludes those phases of the case which make admin-
istration of foreign law by the local tribunal impractical, inconvenient, or violative 
of local policy. In these instances, the local rules at the forum are applied and are 
classified as matters of procedure." 
The implicit assumption th:it procedural determinations do not affect substantive rights 
is clearly erroneous, as the result in Kilberg indicates. 
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been inconvenienced by limiting recovery. The justifications for invoking 
the procedural exception were therefore not present. The court chose, how-
ever, not to follow Supreme Court cases which had classified the question 
of damage limitations as a substantive matter.47 Moreover, the court's 
holding that damage limitations are procedural was misdirected if the real 
desire of the court was merely to compensate New York citizens. If suit 
were to be brough,t in Massachusetts by a New York plaintiff on the basis 
of the New York wrongful death statute, the Massachusetts court, if it 
chose to follow the Kilberg rationale, would limit the recovery available 
to the New York citizen because the measure of damages would be a pro-
cedural matter to be governed by the law of Massachusetts. The court it-
self appeared to recognize the ineptness of its holding, and therefore chose 
to "treat the measure of damages in this case as being a procedural or 
remedial question.''48 The court's willingness to call a question procedural 
because the interests of citizens of the forum might thereby be promoted 
'indicated an unashamedly manipulative attitude toward the lex loci delicti 
rule which is not in keeping with the rule's objectives of uniformity and 
predictability of result. 
The dominant rationale for the holding in Kilberg was that the damage 
limitation of the Massachusetts statute should not be enforced because it 
was contrary to the strong public policy of the forum, which favored un-
limited recovery.49 This rationale was also too broad if the motive of the 
court was only to compensate New York citizens, for a New York court 
would be obliged under this rationale to give unlimited recovery to non-
resident plaintiffs as well. The court, however, was apparently willing to 
give effect to this public policy only when New York had an interest in 
the application of that policy. This interest arose in Kilberg through the 
contact of New York with the case, as the state where the plaintiff's inte-
state resided. Thus the court stated, "For our courts to be limited by this 
damage ceiling (at least as to our own domiciliaries) is so completely con-
trary to our public policy that we should refuse to apply that part of the 
Massachusetts law."50 It thus seems clear that the New York court was using 
the public policy exception as a device to allow the forum to apply its own 
law where its contacts with the parties gave the forum a substantial in-
terest. 51 
The difficulties in Kilberg could be said to stem from the fact that the 
court did not go far enough in rejecting the lex loci delicti rule. For ex-
ample, if the court had frankly admitted that it preferred to apply the 
47 Slater v. Mexican Nat'! R.R., 194 U.S. 120, 126 (1904); Northern Pac. R.R. v. 
Babcock, 154 U.S. 190 (1894). 
48 9 N.Y.2d at 42, 172 N.E.2d at 529, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 137. (Emphasis added.) The pro-
cedural characterization was subsequently withdrawn in Davenport v. Webb, 11 N.Y.2d 392, 
183 N.E.2d 902, 230 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1962). 
49 9 N.Y.2d at 40, 172 N.E.2d at 528, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 136. 
50 Ibid. (Emphasis added.) 
51 See Paulsen &: Sovern, supra note 5, at 1016. 
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forum law where the forum's contacts with the case seemed more significant, 
then the court might have applied the entire New York wrongful death 
statute,152 and the court would not have had to strain exceptions to the 
lex loci delicti rule to reach the desired result.113 All the features of the 
Kilberg opinion which seem objectionable from the point of view of vested 
rights thinkers should rather be seen as symptoms of a profound dissatisfac-
tion with the "accepted pattern of conflict of laws rules." 
In Pearson v. Northeast Airlines54 the Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit stated that the result in Kilberg did not violate the full faith and 
credit clause of the Constitution because "a state with substantial ties to a 
transaction in dispute has a legitimate constitutional interest in the applica-
tion of its own rules of law."155 The court was of the opinion that "by 
weighing the contacts of various states with the transaction, New York may, 
without interfering with the Constitution, shape its rules controlling the 
litigation."1>6 Thus, if the New York court was able reasonably to find that 
its contacts with the dispute were substantial, the court was constitutionally 
free to apply its own state law whether or not it justified its decision in 
terms of the public policy exception to the lex loci delicti rule. Moreover, 
the court in Pearson specifically rejected the notion that adherence to 
the lex loci delicti rule was a test of the constitutionality of a state's choice 
of law.157 The opinion thereby left the door open for outright rejection of 
the rule in the subsequent case of Babcock v. Jackson. 
In sum, the cases from Gordon to Pearson represent an increasing im-
patience with the lex loci delicti rule, a dissatisfaction which showed itself 
in a variety of ways. The Dale System and Grant cases strained to make 
their conclusions seem consistent with the lex loci delicti rule. The later 
Schmidt opinion, on the other hand, openly declared that its resolution 
152 N.Y. DECED. Esr. LAw § 130. In order to apply the New York wrongful death statute 
in the Kilberg situation, however, the court would have had to overrule authority holding 
that the statute applies only to a wrongful death occurring in New York. Cooper v. 
American Airlines, 149 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1945). 
1>3 A further difficulty in Kilberg arose from the court's willingness to enforce a 
foreign statutory right of action without giving effect to a damage limitation which WllJ1 
arguably part of that very right. In Western Union Tel. Co. v. Brown, 234 U.S. 542, 547 
(1914), Mr. Justice Holmes concluded that a statute which creates a cause of action for 
death by a wrongful act may set a limit to the amount which may be recovered; such 
a limitation is part of the right and is governed by the lex loci delicti. Contra, Wooden 
v. Western N.Y. &: P.R.R., 126 N.Y. 10, 26 N.E. 1050 (1891). In any event, if the court had 
chosen to apply the New York wrongful death statute, the problem of whether a damage 
limitation was part of the definition of the right of recovery would have been avoided, 
because New York's statute has no damage limitation. N.Y. DECED. Esr. LAw § 130. 
154 309 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1962), 63 CoLuM. L. REv. 133 (1963). 
!>IS 309 F.2d 553, 559 (2d Cir. 1962). In Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 15 (1962), 
it was said that: "Where more than one State has sufficiently substantial contact with the 
activity in question, the forum State, by analysis of the interests possessed by the States 
involved, could constitutionally apply to the decision of the case the law of one or another 
state having such an interest in the multistate activity." See Currie, The Constitution and 
Choice of Law: Governmental Interests and Judicial Function, 26 U. CHI L. REv. 9 (1958). 
1>0 Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, 309 F.2d 553, 561 (2d Cir. 1962). 
57 Id. at 557. 
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was based entirely on considerations the rule ignored. While Gordon v. 
Parker refused to find that the rule had any relevance to its own particular 
case, the court in Schmidt and Haumschild concluded that the rule had 
no relevance to whole categories of cases. The Grant and Kilberg cases 
relied on very weak authority to invoke the procedural exception to the 
rule, and Haumschild overruled previous decisions which held that the rule 
applied. While Gordon and Dale System admitted no dissatisfaction with 
the workings of the rule, Haumschild and Kilberg called the rule in 
question without even being asked to do so. Schmidt simply refused to 
apply the rule to the case, while Dale, Grant, and Haumschild formulated 
specific new choice of law rules which were at least major qualifications of, 
if not exceptions to, the lex loci delicti rule. And, in Kilberg, the court 
confessed openly that it was rationalizing in order to avoid the normal 
effect of the rule. In all the cases the courts demonstrated a desire not to 
be bound by a mechanical rule which failed to accommodate the equities 
of the parties to relevant policies of the states. The courts apparently pre-
ferred to rely on contacts as a basis for choosing the applicable law. 
THE NEW .APPROACH AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 
In Babcock v. ]ackson58 the New York Court of Appeals became the first 
court to repudiate completely both the old vested rights doctrine and the 
lex loci delicti rule for choice of tort Iaw.59 The court conceded that 
the traditional lex loci delicti choice of law rule could claim the advantages 
of certainty, predictability, and ease of application.110 The court neverthe-
less discarded the rule because it "ignores the interest which jurisdictions 
other than that where the tort occurred may have in the resolution of 
particular issues"61 and therefore leads to "unjust and anomalous results."62 
In justifying its refusal to apply the lex loci delicti rule, the court con-
tended that "it is New York, the place where the parties resided, where 
their guest-host relationship arose and where the trip began and was to 
end, rather than Ontario, the place of the fortuitous occurrence of the 
accident, which has the dominant contacts and superior claim for applica-
tion of its law.''63 The court concluded that disposition of a particular 
issue in a tort suit must turn on the law of the jurisdiction which has the 
strongest interest in the resolution of that issue.64 
58 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963). The Babcock case has been 
noted in numerous law reviews, including 28 .ALBANY L. REv. 128 (1964); 13 AM. U.L. REV. 
158 (1963); 30 BROOKLYN L. REV. 107 (1963); 32 FORDHAM L. REv. 158 (1963); 77 HARV. 
L. REv. 355 (1963); 79 L.Q. Rzy. 484 (1963); 47 MARQ. L. REv. 255 (1963); 15 SYRACUSE 
L. REv. 202 (1963); 49 VA. L. REv. 1362 (1963). See Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, a 
Recent Development in Conflict of Laws, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1212 (1963). 
59 See id. at 1229. 
60 Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 478, 191 N.E.2d 279, 281, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 746-47 
(1963). 
61 Ibid. 
62 Id. at 479, 191 N.E.2d at 282, 240 N.Y .S.2d at 747. 
68 Id. at 483, 191 N.E.2d at 284-85, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 751. 
64 Id. at 484, 191 N.E.2d at 285,240 N.Y .S.2d at 752. 
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The new dominant contacts approach in Babcock differs from the old 
lex loci delicti rule in two major respects. The Babcock approach looks 
to more than the single contact of injury in selecting the governing law 
and, further, the Babcock approach may look to more than one jurisdiction 
to supply the governing law. The new dominant contacts choice of law 
principle is not a jurisdiction-selecting rule designed to designate the law 
-0f a single state to govern all aspects of a tort claim. Instead, the law which 
will govern each issue arising out of the claim is determined by deciding 
which state has the dominant contacts with the case relevant to that par-
ticular issue. Thus, while the court in Babcock was willing to let Ontario 
law govern the issue of standard of care, because the accident occurred on 
an Ontario highway, the court felt that New York law should govern the 
issue of a host's liability to his guest, since the dominant contacts of the 
parties and their trip were with New York. The dominant contacts choice 
of law principle in Babcock is in effect a jurisdiction-selecting rule for 
each issue in the case, which considers more than the single contact of 
injury in choosing the governing law for each issue. In concluding that 
different issues in a case may be governed by the laws of different juris-
dictions, Babcock is the first case to endorse the actual result in the pre-
vious Kilberg decision, which established wrongful death liability under 
Massachusetts law and unlimited recovery under the law of New York. 
In announcing the new approach, the court in Babcock noted with 
approval65 the most recent draft of the Restatement (Second), Conflict of 
Laws,66 which reads, "The local law of the state which has the .most sig-
nificant relationship with the occurrence and with the parties determines 
their rights and liabilities in tort."67 The new Restatement suggests in 
section 379 that in determining the state with the most significant relation-
ship the courts are to consider four contacts: the place of injury, the place 
of conduct, the place of domicil of the parties, and the place of the 
relationships, if any, between the parties. The Babcock dominant contacts 
approach and the Restatement significant relationship principle are similar 
in that both look to more than one contact in selecting the governing law. 
However, the two approaches differ in that the principle advocated by the 
second Restatement, like the old lex loci delicti rule of the first Restate-
ment,68 serves as a jurisdiction-selecting rule to choose the law of one state 
to govern all aspects of the case. Under the view of the second Restate-
ment, a court faced with the Babcock fact situation would have to 
65 Id. at 482, 191 N.E.2d at 283-84, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 749. 
66 R.EsTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAws (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1963). 
67 Id. at § 379. See Comment, 51 CAL. L. REv. 762, 772 (1963). This comment suggests 
that the significant relationship test of the Restatement (Second) is unworkable because 
it fails to evaluate criteria by which significance is to be determined, and offers no 
assistance to a court faced with two competing rules based on diametrically opposed 
policies. 
68 See note 4 supra. See also Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 
HARV. L. REv. 173, 178 (1933). 
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apply the law of one jurisdiction to both the issues of standard of care 
and host's liability to his guest, on the assumption that the law of the 
state with the "most significant relationship" to the case as a whole is also 
the most appropriate law to govern each issue in the case. The Babcock 
approach does not make this assumption, and therefore does not have to 
find a reasonable basis for selecting the law of one state to govern an entire 
case. The court in Babcock is probably correct in saying that "there is no 
reason why all issues arising out of a tort claim must be resolved by 
reference to the law of the same jurisdiction,"69 and, if so, the Babcock 
approach avoids an assumption which makes choice of law under the 
second Restatement view unnecessarily difficult. The Babcock approach 
does not require determination of which state has "the most significant 
relationship with the occurrence and with the parties" when one issue con-
cerns the occurrence alone, and another issue the parties alone. 
A further advantage of the Babcock approach is that it permits courts 
not wishing to apply the law of one jurisdiction to every issue to avoid 
reclassifying certain problems simply to escape the usual rule for choice of 
tort law. For example, in the Haumschild fact situation a court adopting 
the Babcock approach would not have to reclassify the question of inter-
spousal immunity as one of family law rather than tort law in order 
to apply the law of the parties' domicil. The new approach would allow 
the court to say that the law of the parties' domicil should govern the 
question of interspousal immunity because the place of domicil has the 
dominant contacts with this particular issue in the case. The desired result 
would thereby be reached within the framework of a choice of tort law rule, 
and not by avoiding such a rule. Similarly, in the Grant v. McAuliffe situa-
tion the law of the place of the administration of the decedent's estate 
would be said to govern the question of survival of a tort action because 
that jurisdiction has the dominant contacts with the issue of survival. In 
this fashion, the Babcock approach would have provided a more satisfactory 
rationale for the decisions of most of the pre-Babcock cases discussed above. 
Despite the fact that the Babcock approach has clear advantages over 
the views of both Restatements, it nevertheless raises difficult problems. If 
Babcock merely stands for the proposition that the law of the state having 
dominant contacts with the particular issue will govern that issue, it gives 
little direction to courts which must decide what contacts are dominant in 
a particular case. The ambiguity in the notion of dominant contacts can 
be at least partially clarified, however, by assuming that apparent contacts 
of a state with the matter in issue become significant at all only insofar as 
they give that state an interest in the application of its own policies to the 
dispute.70 Under this analysis, a contact is significant only to the extent 
69 Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 484, 191 N.E.2d 279, 285, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 752 
(1963). 
70 See Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 1959 DUKE 
L.J. 171, 178: "2. When it is suggested that the rule of a foreign state should furnish 
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that it makes some state policy relevant to the resolution of the issue. For 
example, in Babcock, New York had a policy of requiring the driver of an 
automobile to compensate his guest for injuries caused by the driver's 
negligence,71 and this policy was made relevant to the liability issue in 
Babcock by the fact that New York was the state of domicil of both parties 
and also the state where their guest-host relationship arose.72 The policy 
of compensating the guest made these contacts significant because the 
contacts made the policy relevant. On the other hand, Ontario's policy 
concerning the host's liability was not relevant to the issue because Ontario 
had no connection with the parties or their relationship.73 The policy be-
hind the Ontario guest statute was to protect Ontario insurers against 
collusion,74 but this policy was irrelevant to the dispute, because the host 
did not have an Ontario insurer. The absence of any Ontario contact with 
this issue in the case meant that Ontario had no interest in applying its 
own policy, and that therefore the New York policy should govern. 
I£ signifiant contacts give a state an interest in applying its own policies 
to a dispute, then the state with dominant contacts will have the strongest 
interest in resolving the issue in its own way. However, the question remains 
as to what makes contacts dominant in situations where more than one state 
has significant contacts and therefore conflicting interests arise. For ex-
ample, in the Kilberg situation, Massachusetts as the domicil of the de-
fendant had an interest in applying its policy of limiting recovery, but New 
York as the domicil of the plaintiff's intestate had an interest in applying 
its policy of unlimited recovery.75 Likewise, in Babcock, i£ the host had had 
an Ontario insurer, both Ontario and New York would have had significant 
contacts with the issue of guest-host liability. It is not immediately obvious 
why the contacts of one state should be considered to predominate over 
those of another. Any answer to this question will depend upon whether 
courts adopt a quantitative or a qualitative approach, that is, whether 
courts will merely count contacts or will evaluate them according to their 
individual significance. 
the rule of decision, the court should, first of all, determine the governmental policy 
expressed in the law of the forum. It should then inquire whether the relation of the 
forum to the case is such as to provide a legitimate basis for the assertion of an interest 
in the application of that policy •••• 3. If necessary, the court should similarly determine 
the policy expressed by the foreign law, and whether the foreign state has an interest 
in the application of its policy." 
71 Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 482, 191 N.E.2d 279, 284, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 750 
(1963). 
72 Id. at 483, 191 N.E.2d at 284,240 N.Y.S.2d at 751. 
73 On the other hand, it could be argued that the question in Babcock of whether to 
apply Ontario's guest statute was a question of the standard of care to be demanded of 
the host. Under this analysis, a policy of Ontario would be made relevant to the dispute 
by Ontario's contact with the case as the scene of the accident, since even the court in 
Babcock admitted that the issue of standard of care should be governed by Ontario law. 
Id. at 483, 191 N.E.2d at 285, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 750-51. 
74 Survey of Canadian Legislation, 1 U. TORONTO L.J. 358, 366 (1936). 
75 Currie, Conflict, Crisis and Confusion in New York, 1963 DuKE L.J. 1, 16. 
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If courts adopt a quantitative approach, then the law of the state with 
the greatest number of significant contacts with the issue will govern. 
However, a "dominant contacts" test based on the mere number of sig-
nificant contacts does not solve the problems of conflicting interests which 
arise when two or more states each have an equal number of significant 
contacts. In such cases, courts would be tempted to find other contacts of 
one of the states, and count them as significant without a careful evaluation 
of their individual importance, in order to reach or rationalize a result. 
For example, the court in Babcock listed the circumstances that the trip 
during which the injury occurred began and was to end in New York as 
significant contacts of New York with the dispute,76 although these contacts 
would seem to have in themselves no special relevance to New York's com-
pensatory and admonitory polices underlying the host's liability to his 
guest. Moreover, the court counted the occurrence of the tort in Ontario 
as only one contact,77 although strictly speaking Ontario was both the place 
of the defendant's wrongful conduct and the place of the resulting harm. 
The court apparently wanted to be sure that New York's contacts would 
outnumber those of Ontario. Implicit in the listing of contacts in Babcock 
is the suggestion, whether consciously intended _or not, that the state with 
dominant contacts is merely the state with the greatest number of contacts. 
A quantitative appr_oach of this sort would seem to encourage excessive 
concern with a mere listing of contacts, without corresponding analysis of 
their relative significance to the matter in issue.78 As a result, a quantitative 
approach would probably not give the courts sufficient guidance in coming 
to a conclusion in cases where two or more states each have significant con-
tacts with the matter in dispute. The courts in these cases would most likely 
count contacts so as to rationalize a result already determined in some other 
way 
A qualitative approach, however, would probably give the courts no 
further guidance where two or more states each had significant contacts 
with a matter in dispute. The underlying policy conflicts would still require 
the courts to make a choice and rationalize it by saying that the state whose 
law was chosen had the most significant contact with the matter in dispute. 
For example, in Kilberg, a conclusion that New York had the more sig-
nificant contacts because it was the domicil of the plaintiff's intestate, would 
not have been a basis for decision but only a justification for the choice of 
law. The same preference for New York's compensatory policy which 
would have led the court to choose New York law would also have been 
the motive for calling New York's contacts more significant than those of 
Massachusetts. 
76 Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 483, 191 N.E.2d 279, 285, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 751 
(1963). 
77 Ibid. 
78 See Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, a Recent Development in Conflict of Laws, 
63 CoLuM. L. REv. 1212, 1248 (1963) (comment by Professor Leflar rejects quantitative 
approach). 
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The dominant contacts test enables courts to find significant contacts as 
the basis for choosing applicable law. However, the test becomes merely a 
rationalization once it has been determined that more than one state has 
significant contacts with the dispute. When a choice must be made as to 
which state has the dominant contacts, the courts are left with no satisfac-
tory means of determining which contacts are more significant than others, 
regardless of whether the courts adopt a quantitative or qualitative ap-
proach. The concern of the courts at this point must be not with contacts 
themselves but rather with the policies which made these contacts sig-
nificant in the first place. A preference for one policy over another in 
situations like Kilberg must be determined in some other way than evalua-
tion of contacts, since contacts can only make policies relevant, but not 
controlling. This is not to say that a contacts test can never itself dictate 
a result. In cases where only one state has significant contacts, the dominant 
contacts test would naturally select the law of that state to govern the issue. 
But where two jurisdictions both have an unquestioned interest based on 
contacts in giving effect to their own policies, the choice of law must de-
pend on the court's own decision as to which policy it prefers, with no help 
from the dominant contacts choice of law principle. 
Before a court can resolve a policy conflict, however, it must discover 
what policies underlie the potentially applicable laws, and also define the 
scope of those policies. In many instances, laws may be merely arbitrary 
rules for solving problems, without any particular policy justification be-
hind them.78 Furthermore, even if a law in question is intended to effectuate 
a policy, its legislative history will often be so inconclusive and judicial 
interpretations so sparse or diverse that the underlying policy can not be 
articulated clearly.80 Moreover, it may not be clear whether a policy, once 
discovered, is intended to be unlimited in its application or restricted to 
the domiciliaries of the particular state.81 The Babcock approach forces 
courts to consider these problems in situations where several states ap-
parently have significant contacts with the dispute. 
In fact, the dominant contacts principle of the Babcock case is not really 
a choice of law rule at all, but rather an approach to the problem which 
has neither the advantages nor disadvantages of a rule. The new approach 
permits the courts to consider the contacts of states with an issue, as a pre-
lude to deciding which relevant policies should be given effect. The results 
are not dictated, and the decision may be difficult. Therefore the advan-
70 Professor Max Rheinstein of the University of Chicago Law School made this point 
during a critique of the Cooley Lectures held at The University of Michigan Law School 
on Jan. 29, 1964. 
80 For example, in regard to statutes granting interspousal immunity from tort suits, 
the policy may be to prevent a disruption of the marriage relationship, to prevent 
collusion by the spouses against their insurer, or to prevent unwitting participation by 
the court in possible fraud. 
81 For example, in Kilberg, it is uncertain whether the policy of the New York Con-
stitution allowing unlimited recovery for wrongful death is intended to benefit all plain-
tiffs suing in New York courts, or only those plaintiffs who happen to reside in New York. 
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tages of certainty, predictability, and ease of application which a general 
rule would afford are undoubtedly lost. The new approach, however, pro-
vides a framework for decision in which the equities of the parties and the 
policies of the states are sure to be considered. The language of the new 
approach may prove in true conflict situations to be no more than a means 
by which to rationalize decisions, rather than the actual grounds of deci-
sion. But at least the courts, before reaching their results, will have had to ex-
amine many relevant considerations necessarily ignored_by a mechanical rule. 
The new approach in effect places choice of tort law in the judge's discre-
tion in complex cases where several states have a legitimate interest, based 
on contacts, in giving effect to their policies.82 The new approach there-
fore allows courts to avoid the unsatisfying results which sometimes oc-
curred under the old lex loci delicti rule. However, the new approach will 
prove itself preferable to the old rule only if the courts are willing to 
demonstrate the judicial sophistication, precision, and impartiality. it 
requires. 
Cases of true policy conflict will probably be rare.88 Most cases can 
probably be resolved by a recognition that the policy of one jurisdiction 
is not relevant to the particular issue. For example, in Gordon v. Parker 
Pennsylvania as the place of the matrimonial domicil probably had no 
policy in favor of preventing recovery for alienation of affections outside 
of Pennsylvania. In cases of true conflict, a court might choose one policy 
over another on the basis of the relative strength with which the policy 
is asserted in the law of each state. For example, the court in Kilberg 
might have been justified in preferring the New York policy of unlimited 
recovery for wrongful death because this policy was articulated in the 
New York Constitution, whereas the Massachusetts policy of limited 
recovery was merely found in a statute. Likewise, if one competing policy 
finds support in a long line of precedent, it might well be preferred over 
another policy which is enunciated in only a handful of cases. In true 
conflict cases where the relative strength of policy assertion is about equal, 
a court might look to the expectations of the parties as to which law would 
govern. It is true that the parties' expectations are not so great a factor in 
tort .as in contract law, because the parties probably did not anticipate that 
a tort would occur. Nevertheless, if there had been a true conflict of policy 
in Babcock, £or example, the court might have been justified in applying 
New York rather than Ontario law because this was the law the parties 
82 See Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, supra note 78, at 1251. Professor Leflar feels 
the Babcock approach leaves room for discretion in choice of law. Similarly, REsTATEMENT 
(SECOND), CONFLICT OF LA.ws, § 379a, comment e, 18, 19 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1963), allows 
judicial discretion in choice of tort law by permitting application of "the local law of a 
state which is not the place of conduct and injury in a situation where application of the 
local law of the state of conduct and injury would lead to a result which the court 
believes to be unjust." 
83 This will be true in part because laws often are merely arbitrary rules for handling 
problems, without any basis in particular policies. See note 79 supra. 
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would probably have expected to govern their guest-host relation if they 
had considered the matter at all. 
Since the Babcock dominant contacts approach does not itself resolve 
cases of true policy conflict, courts £acing such conflicts may need guide-
lines for the exercise of discretion such as those suggested above in order 
to arrive at decisions to be rationalized in terms of dominant contacts.84 
Professor Cavers of Harvard has suggested in his recent Cooley Lectures 
given at Michigan Law School that there is a need for "principles of 
preference" to help judges £aced with true policy confl.icts.85 Perhaps such 
principles, if there is truly a need for them, would best be formulated by 
the judges themselves, who have been enabled by the new Babcock approach 
to announce more candidly than before the actual reasons for their decisions. 
Arthur M. Sherwood 
84 Alternative guidelines have been proposed by Professors Currie and Ehrenzweig. 
See Currie, supra note 70, at 178: "If the court finds that the forum state has an interest 
in the application of its policy, it should apply the law of the forum, even though the 
foreign state also has an interest in the application of its contrary policy, and, a fortiori, 
it should apply the law of the forum if the foreign state has no such interest." Compare 
Ehrenzweig, The Lex Fori-Basic Rule in the Conflict of Laws, 58 MICH. L. R.Ev. 637, 644 
(1960): "[P]ropositions as to a priori 'applicable' or 'governing' law, such as the lex loci 
delicti or situs ••• should be preserved, but only where, and insofar as, they have sufficiently 
crystallized in certain specific situations so as to be tenable as other exceptions from a 
basic lex fori." 
85 Cavers, Thomas M. Cooley Lecture No. 3, "Principles of Preference in Resolving 
True Conflicts," delivered Jan. 24, 1964, at the University of Michigan Law School. 
